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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to study the concept of admissi-
bility in abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs). While admissibility is
well-understood in Dung-style frameworks, a generalization to ADFs is
not trivial. Indeed, the original proposal turned out to behave unintu-
itively at certain instances. A recent approach circumvented this problem
by using a three-valued concept. In this paper, we propose a novel two-
valued approach which more directly follows the original understanding
of admissibility. We compare the two approaches and show that they
behave differently on certain ADFs. Our results imply that for general-
izations of Dung-style frameworks, establishing a precise correspondence
between two-valued (i.e. extension-based) and three-value (i.e. labeling-
based) characterizations of argumentation semantics is not easy and re-
quires further investigations.
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1 Introduction
Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks [1] have proven successful in many
applications related to multi-agent systems (see, e.g. [2]). These frameworks are
conceptually simple and appealing: arguments are viewed only on an abstract
level and a binary attack relation models conflicts between arguments. In several
domains this simplicity however leads to certain limitations. Therefore, several
enrichments of Dung’s approach were proposed [3–9], with abstract dialecti-
cal frameworks (ADFs) [10] being one of the most general of these concepts.1
Simply speaking, in ADFs it is not only the arguments that are abstract but
also the relations between them. This is achieved by associating a propositional
formula with each argument describing its relation to the other arguments. A
1 A different approach to model relations between arguments which are beyond attack
is meta-argumentation [11]. Here additional (artificial) arguments are added together
with certain gadgets to capture the functioning of relations which cannot be modeled
with binary attacks.
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common problem in applications of abstract argumentation concerns instantia-
tion. Preliminary results on this matter in the case of ADFs can be found in this
volume [12]. Moreover, the application of ADFs in the context of the Carneades
system [13] and proof standards [10] have been studied in the literature, advis-
ing that ADFs might also be applicable to certain problems from the domain of
multi-agent systems.
One of the most central concepts in Dung’s frameworks is the notion of ad-
missibility which is based on defense. In a nutshell, an argument a is defended
(in a given framework) by a set S of arguments if all arguments attacking a are
counter-attacked by S. A (conflict-free) set S of arguments is called admissible if
each a ∈ S is defended by S. In fact, many semantics for abstract argumentation
are based on admissibility, and in the context of instantiation-based argumen-
tation, admissibility plays an important role w.r.t. rationality postulates, see
e.g. [14].
While the concept of admissibility is very intuitive in the Dung setting it is
not easy to be generalized to extensions of the Dung–style framework where rela-
tions between arguments are not restricted to attacks. As a minimal requirement
for such generalized notions of admissibility one would first state “downward-
compatibility”. Basically speaking, if a given object F in an extended formalism
corresponds to a standard Dung framework F ′, then the admissible (in its gen-
eralized form) sets of F should match the admissible sets of F ′. In the world
of ADFs, the original proposal for admissibility, albeit satisfying this minimal
requirement, turned out to behave unintuitively at certain instances. A recent
approach first presented in [15] and slightly simplified in [16] is based on (post)
fixed points in three–valued interpretations. However, the original intuition that
arguments in the set have to “stand together” against the arguments outside the
set is somehow lost in that approach (nonetheless, there is a certain correspon-
dence to the characteristic function of Dung-style frameworks).
In this work, we propose a novel two–valued approach which more directly
follows the original understanding of admissibility. We call our approach the
decisive outing formulation, reflecting its definition which iteratively decides of
the status of the arguments. We compare our approach with the three–valued
approach from [16] and show that the two semantics can consider different sets
of arguments admissible. Since both approaches are downward–compatible, they
clearly coincide on Dung-style ADFs; in the paper, we define another class of
ADFs where this relation is also preserved. Finally, we further elaborate on these
two approaches by showing that each decisive outing admissible extension has a
counterpart in the three–valued setting, but not vice versa.
Our results not only show that admissibility can be naturally generalized
in different ways, they also imply that for descendants of Dung–style frameworks,
establishing one–to–one correspondences between two–valued (i.e. extension–
based) and three–valued (i.e. labeling–based) characterizations of argumentation
semantics is not necessarily granted. This could stipulate further investigations
towards a better understanding of admissibility for more expressive formalisms
taking into account also the work of Kakas et al. [17] in logic programming.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoreti-
cal background and notations. Section 3 is dedicated to describing and comparing
the three formulations of admissibility and Section 4 is focused on discussion and
some pointers for future work.
2 Background
2.1 Dung’s Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
The argumentation framework developed by Phan Minh Dung is the simplest,
yet quite powerful, formalism for abstract argumentation [1].
Definition 1. A Dung abstract argumentation framework, or a Dung
Framework is a pair (A,R), where A is a set of arguments and R ⊆ A × A
represents the attack relation.
Due to the great interest it has received, many semantics have been devel-
oped. Semantics define the properties or methods of obtaining framework exten-
sions, i.e. sets of arguments we can accept. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed
that any rational opinion should be consistent. This minimal property is ex-
pressed with the conflict–free semantics, a common root for all other developed
approaches.2
Definition 2. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework. A set S ⊆ A is a
conflict–free extension of AF , if for each a, b ∈ S, (a, b) /∈ R.
Admissibility is another fundamental requirement in argumentation. It comes
from the fact that regardless of the presented point of view, we should be able
to defend it. In the Dung setting, due to only one type of relation, it boils down
to the following definitions.
Definition 3. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework. An argument a ∈ A is
defended by a set S in AF , if for each b ∈ A s.t. (b, a) ∈ R, there exists c ∈ S
s.t. (c, b) ∈ R. A conflict–free extension S is an admissible extension of AF
if each a ∈ S is defended by S in AF .
With this at hand, we can start describing the stronger semantics. They can
be roughly grouped by varying concepts of maximality or skepticism. Prominent
examples are the stable and preferred semantics.
Definition 4. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework. A conflict–free extension
S is a stable extension of AF iff for each a ∈ A \ S there exists an argument
b ∈ S s.t. (b, a) ∈ R.
2 Conflict–freeness and admissibility can also be treated as some basic properties,
rather than very weak semantics. Due to the fact that in some approaches of ar-
gumentation frameworks additional types of conflict–freeness have been introduced,
we have chosen the latter.
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a b c d e
Fig. 1. Sample Dung framework
Definition 5. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework. A preferred extension
of AF is a maximal admissible extension of AF w.r.t. subset inclusion.
We close the list with a semantics belonging to the unique–state approach
class, i.e. a semantics producing only a single extension. To this end, we first
need to introduce the characteristic function of a framework.
Definition 6. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework. Its characteristic func-
tion FAF : 2
A → 2A is defined as follows:
FAF (S) = {a | a is defended by S in AF}
Definition 7. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework. The grounded exten-
sion of AF is the least fixed point of FAF .
Please note that further semantics can be described via the characteristic
function [1, 15]. For our purposes, the most important is the alternative formu-
lation of admissibility as already presented in [1].
Lemma 1. Let AF = (A,R) be a Dung framework and FAF its characteristic
function. A set S ⊆ A is an admissible extension of AF iff it is conflict–free
and S ⊆ FAF (S).
Example 1. Consider the Dung framework AF = (A,R) with A = {a, b, c, d, e}
and the attack relation R = {(a, b), (c, b), (c, d), (d, c), (d, e), (e, e)}, as depicted
in Figure 1. It has eight conflict–free extensions in total, namely {a, c},{a, d},
{b, d}, {a}, {b}, {c}, {d} and ∅. As b is attacked by an unattacked argument, it
cannot be defended against it and will not be in any admissible extension. We
end up with two preferred extensions, {a, c} and {a, d}. However, only {a, d} is
stable, and {a} is the grounded extension.
2.2 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
The main goal of abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) [10] is to overcome
the limitations of the pure attack relation in the Dung frameworks and its de-
scendants. They assume some predefined set of connection types – attacking,
attacking or supporting, and so on – which affects what can be expressed in
a framework naturally, and what requires some semantics–dependent modifi-
cations. In ADFs relation abstractness is achieved by the introduction of the
acceptance conditions instead of adding new elements to the set of relations.
They define what (sets of) arguments related to a given argument should be
present for it to be included/excluded from an extension.
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Definition 8. An abstract dialectical framework (ADF) is a tuple (S,L,C),
where S is a set of abstract arguments (nodes, statements), L ⊆ S × S is a
set of links (edges) and C = {Cs}s∈S is a set of acceptance conditions, one
condition per each argument.
Originally, the acceptance conditions were defined in terms of functions:
Definition 9. Let (S,L,C) be an ADF. The set of parents of an argument s,
denoted par(s), consists of those p ∈ S for which (p,s) ∈ L. An acceptance
condition is given by a total function Cs : 2
par(s) → {in, out}.
Alternatively, one can also use the propositional formula representation, de-
scribed in detail in [18]. These two forms are equivalent, and we will be referring
to both of them in the rest of this paper.
Definition 10. Let (S,L,C) be an ADF. Propositional acceptance condi-
tions are formulas of the form:
ϕ ::= a ∈ S | ⊥ | > | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | (ϕ→ ϕ)
All and only parents of an argument appear as atoms in the acceptance condition
of this argument. In what follows, we use a : ϕ as shorthand for Ca = ϕ.
Note that the set L of links can be extracted from the acceptance conditions
(more on this matter can be found in [18]). Hence, making it explicit is not
necessary. We have decided to keep L in its current form in order to have a
consistent representation when weights or more advanced relation properties are
added to ADFs.
In the original setting, the truth value of a formula is based on the standard
propositional valuation function (i.e. truth tables). However, in [16] Kleene’s
strong three–valued logic has been used. We will come back to this approach
in Section 3.
Due to the abstractness of ADFs, redefining the semantics in an intuitive
manner is still an ongoing work and one of the main topics of this paper. In order
to take the research step by step, a subclass of ADFs called bipolar was identified
in the original paper [10]:
Definition 11. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF. A link (r, s) ∈ L is
1. supporting: for no R ⊆ par(s) we have Cs(R) = in and Cs(R∪{r}) = out,
2. attacking: for no R ⊆ par(s) we have Cs(R) = out and Cs(R ∪ {r}) = in.
D is bipolar iff all links in L are supporting or attacking and we can write it as
D = (S, (L+ ∪L−), C). The links L+ denote the supporting links and L− denote
the attacking links. The set of parents supporting an argument x is defined as
suppD(x) = {y | (y, x) ∈ L+}. The set of parents attacking an argument x is
defined as attD(x) = {y | (y, x) ∈ L−}.
Along with the support relations came the problem of the support cycles. We
will discuss it further in Section 4.
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b a ∧ ¬c c
Fig. 2. Example of support cycles
Definition 12. Let D = (S, (L+ ∪ L−), C) be a bipolar ADF. D is a bipolar
ADF without support cycles if L+ is acyclic.
Example 2. Let us look at the ADF depicted in Figure 2: D = ({a, b, c, }, {(a, b),
(b, a), (c, b), (c, c)}, {a : b, b : a ∧ ¬c, c : c}). In this case c self–supports itself,
and a and b exchange supports.
We continue with several semantics that have already been developed for the
general class of ADFs.
Definition 13. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF. M ⊆ S is a conflict–free ex-
tension of D if for all s ∈M we have Cs(M ∩ par(s)) = in.
The model semantics follows the ’what can be accepted, should be accepted’
intuition. It coincides with the stable semantics in the Dung setting.
Definition 14. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF. M ⊆ S is a model of D if M is
conflict–free and ∀ s ∈ S, Cs(M ∩ par(s)) = in implies s ∈M .
Finally, we also have the grounded semantics (here referred to as well–
founded). Just like in the Dung framework, it is obtained by the means of a
special function:
Definition 15. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF. Consider the operator
ΓWD (A,R) = (acc(A,R), reb(A,R))
where:
acc(A,R) = {r ∈ S | A ⊆ S′ ⊆ (S\R)⇒ Cr(S′ ∩ par(s)) = in}
reb(A,R) = {r ∈ S | A ⊆ S′ ⊆ (S\R)⇒ Cr(S′ ∩ par(s)) = out}
ΓWD is monotonic in both arguments and thus has a least fix–point. E is the
well–founded model of D iff for some E′ ⊆ S, (E,E′) is the least fix–point of
ΓWD .
Example 3. Let us transform the Dung framework F = (A,R) from Example 1
into an ADF D = (S,L,C). The set of arguments does not change: A = S. The
same goes for the set of links, please note however, that L loses its meaning – it
now represents the connections only, without any information as to their nature.
Argument a is unattacked and can always be accepted, hence its acceptance
condition is >. b can only be accepted when both a and c are not present (¬a∧
¬c). Next, c and d mutually exclude one another (respectively ¬d and ¬c).
Finally, e is attacked not only by d, but also by itself, and its acceptance condition
is ¬d ∧ ¬e. Therefore in total we obtain an abstract dialectical framework D =
(A,R, {a : >, b : ¬a ∧ ¬c, c : ¬d, d : ¬c, e : ¬d ∧ ¬e}).
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T ¬a ∧ ¬c ¬d ¬c ¬d ∧ ¬e
Fig. 3. Sample Dung–style ADF
2.3 Kleene’s Three–Valued Logic and Interpretations
In order to be able to explain one of the approaches to the admissibility in ADFs,
we need to provide a short recap on the three–valued interpretations and lattices.
A more detailed background can be found in [16].
Given a set of arguments S, a three–valued interpretation is a mapping
v : S → {t, f,u}. The truth tables for the basic connectives are given in Fig-
ure 4.
¬
t f
f t
u u
∨ t u f
t t t t
u t u u
f t u f
∧ t u f
t t u f
u u u f
f f f f
→ t u f
t t u f
u t u u
f t t t
Fig. 4. Truth tables for the three–valued logic of Kleene
Let us assume the following partial order≤i according to information content:
u <i t and u <i f. The pair ({t, f,u},≤i) forms a complete meet–semilattice
with the meet operation u assigning values in the following way: t u t = t,
f u f = f and u in all other cases. Given two valuations v and v′, we say that v′
contains more information than v, denoted v ≤i v′ iff ∀s∈S v(s) ≤i v′(s); in
case v is three–valued and v′ two–valued, then we say that v′ extends v. This
means that elements mapped originally to u are now assigned either t or f. The
set of all two–valued interpretations extending v is denoted [v]2.
Given a set A, we say that an interpretation v is partial if it is defined for
a nonempty B ⊆ A. Let v′ be some interpretation on A. We define a shorthand
v ⊆ v′ meaning that ∀b ∈ B, v(b) = v′(b). We say that v′ is completion of v
to A. v′ is respectively a t/f/u–completion, if it maps all elements from A \B
to respectively t/f/u.
It is often very handy to be able to talk about the set of arguments mapped
to a certain value by a given interpretation:
Definition 16. Let v be an interpretation. Then vx = {s | v(s) = x} for
x ∈ {t, f} in case v is two–valued and x ∈ {t, f ,u} if v is three–valued.
When it comes to the two–valued setting, we can use interpretations and sets of
accepted arguments as extensions interchangeably as they uniquely define one
another. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the three–valued interpreta-
tions. In order to compare both of these settings we need to focus on arguments
accepted in both of them. Therefore, sometimes we may refer to a family of the
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three–valued interpretations using a set of arguments they map to t. Finally,
we define a shorthand v(ϕ) for evaluation of a propositional formula ϕ under
an interpretation v.
3 Admissible Semantics for ADFs
In this section we will recall some work on argumentation semantics and discuss
several approaches to defining the admissibility for ADFs. We will start with the
original definition from [10] and recall some objections raised on it. Then, we
introduce two recent formulations (one from [16] and our own novel approach)
that are different both in spirit and resulting extensions. At the end of this
section we will compare the two in a formal way.
3.1 Related Work on Semantics Rationalities
Throughout the time, many different argumentation semantics have been devel-
oped [19]. Very often a new semantics is an improvement of an already existing
one by introducing further restrictions on the set of accepted arguments or pos-
sible attackers. One of the most important semantical problems is concerned
with the cycles in a framework. A thorough study of attack cycles and self–
attackers in the Dung setting can be found in [20]. In the bipolar setting, the
situation is not yet analyzed this well and approaches differ between available
frameworks [5, 9, 21]. The moment we introduce a new type of relation, the
situation gets more complicated and every Dung semantics gives rise to several
further specializations. Currently, our focus is on whether arguments taking part
in support cycles can be in an extension and if they should be considered valid
attackers. We will discuss the validity of support cycles further in Section 4.
The two recent definitions of admissibility we are going to present differ in the
treatment of cycles. The explanation will be provided in Section 3.5.
3.2 Original Formulation
The main motivation behind the original formulation of admissibility in [10] was
to create a definition that would not explicitly use the notion of defense. Unfor-
tunately, it was only applicable for the bipolar ADFs. The admissible extensions
were obtained via the stable models as proposed in [10].
Definition 17. Let D = (S,L,C) be a bipolar ADF. A model M of D is a
stable model of D if M is the least model of the reduced ADF DM obtained
from D by:
1. eliminating all nodes not contained in M together with all links in which any
of these nodes appear,
2. eliminating all attacking links,
3. replacing in each acceptance condition Cs of a node s in D
M each occurrence
of a statement t 6∈M with ⊥.
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With this at hand, admissible semantics are defined as follows.
Definition 18. Let D = (S,L,C) be a bipolar ADF. M ⊆ S is admissible in
D iff there is R ⊆ S such that no element in R attacks an element in M and M
is a stable model of D \R.
d c a b
¬b ∨ ¬c TdT
Fig. 5. Counterexample for the original formulation of admissibility.
However, this definition has been proved to give undesired extensions [16].
Take for example the framework depicted in Figure 5. In this setting we have
the following admissible extensions: ∅, {b}, {d}, {b, d}, {a, b}, {c, d}, {c, b, d}.
{a, b} is not a desired answer as we have no way of preventing our opponent
from uttering c since the acceptance condition of d is always in. Therefore, the
need for a more appropriate definition arises.
3.3 Lattice Formulation
In abstract argumentation, semantics can usually be described in more than one
way. The main idea behind it is to provide a relatively constructive formulation
that would give us a hint on how to create extensions in a more systematic
manner. For example, in case of Dung’s frameworks grounded and admissible
extensions can be obtained via the characteristic function (see Section 2.1). For
ADFs, the original definition has been revised and a new, constructive variant,
based on (post) fixed-points, is presented in [15]. A simplified approach published
in [16] is based on three–valued interpretations, which we will use in this paper.
The semantics are defined via the following operator, which is similar to the
characteristic function of Dung’s frameworks. Based on a three-valued interpre-
tation a new one is returned by the function, which accepts or rejects arguments
based on the given interpretation. For convenience we will slightly abuse our
notation and identify in with t and out with f .
Definition 19. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF, v a three–valued interpretation
defined over S, s ∈ S and ΓD : (S → {t, f ,u})→ (S → {t, f ,u}) a function from
three-valued interpretations to three-valued interpretations. Then ΓD(v) = v
′
with
v′(s) =
l
w∈[v]2
Cs(par(s) ∩ wt)
That is, given a three-valued v interpretation a new one is returned by ΓD for
an ADF D. The new truth value for each argument s is given by considering all
two-valued interpretations that extend v, i.e. all interpretations that assign either
t or f to an argument, which is assigned u by v. Now we evaluate the acceptance
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condition of each argument under all these two–valued interpretations. If all of
them agree on the truth value, i.e. all of them evaluate to in (t) or respectively
out (f) , then this is the result or the overall consensus. Otherwise, if there is a
disagreement, i.e. we have t for one evaluation and f for another, then the result
is undecided, i.e. u.
The new definition of admissibility resembles the one for AFs. We apply
ΓD similarly as the characteristic function and just use the information order-
ing instead of the subset relation. Please note that conflict–freeness is already
incorporated in this definition.
Definition 20. A three-valued interpretation v for an ADF D = (S,L,C) is
admissible in D iff v ≤i ΓD(v).
The following example illustrates this definition.
Example 4. Let us go back to the framework in Figure 5. The following three-
valued interpretations are then admissible v1 = {d 7→ u, b 7→ u, c 7→ u, a 7→ u},
v2 = {d 7→ t, b 7→ u, c 7→ u, a 7→ u}, v3 = {d 7→ t, b 7→ u, c 7→ t, a 7→ u},
v4 = {d 7→ u, b 7→ t, c 7→ u, a 7→ u}, v5 = {d 7→ t, b 7→ t, c 7→ u, a 7→ u},
v6 = {d 7→ t, b 7→ t, c 7→ t, a 7→ u}, v7 = {d 7→ t, b 7→ t, c 7→ t, a 7→ f}.
Let us inspect closer why v7 is admissible in this ADF. The three-valued
interpretation v7 is already two–valued, i.e. no argument is assigned the value
u. This means that [v7]2 = {v7}. Now if we evaluate for each argument its
acceptance condition under v7, then the result is the same as the assigned value
by v7. Consider for instance argument a with the acceptance condition ¬b ∨ ¬c
as a propositional formula. This formula evaluates to f under v7, which is the
same value assigned by v7, i.e. v7(a) = Ca(par(a) ∩ vt7) = f .
Considering a slightly more complex example, let us look at v6. Here [v6]2 =
{v, v′} with v = {d 7→ t, b 7→ t, c 7→ t, a 7→ t} and v′ = {d 7→ t, b 7→ t, c 7→ t,
a 7→ f}. This means we have to consider both evaluations, one assigning the
argument a true and one false. Now the acceptance condition of a evaluates under
both v and v′ to f . This means that ΓD(v6) = v′6 and v6(a) = u ≤i v′6(a) = f ,
since f u f = f . Similarly for the other arguments and hence v6 is admissible.
Let us check if there exists an admissible three–valued interpretation v, which
assigns f to d, i.e. v(d) = f . Since the acceptance condition of d always evaluates
to true, we know that for any two-valued interpretation w we have Ca(par(a) ∩
wt) = t. This in particular holds for for all v′ ∈ [v]2. Hence ΓD(v) = v′, with
v(d) = f 6≤i t = v′(d) and v is not admissible.
3.4 Decisive Outing Formulation
We now introduce an alternative definition of admissibility that comes back to
the intuition behind the semantics. An admissible extension is supposed to be
able to ’stand on its own’ [22], i.e. discard any argument that would render any of
the set’s elements unacceptable. In the Dung setting, a set defends an argument
if it attacks all of its attackers. In the ADF setting, which is more abstract, this is
not enough. We can discard an argument in more ways than just a direct attack
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– overall we want to make sure that the acceptance of a different argument will
not make the ’bad’ one acceptable via a chain reaction. Moreover, due to the
various types of relations available in ADF, it might be the case that to discard
one argument, more counterarguments may be required (in the Dung case, one
’attacker’ per ’attacker’ was sufficient).
This intuition is enough to create a definition of admissibility that does not
make use of the notion of attack or defense, which is quite appropriate for this
abstract setting. Our approach is based on iteratively building a set of arguments
that our candidate for admissibility has the power to permanently set to out.
Important in this construction is the notion of decisiveness:
Definition 21. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF and s ∈ S. Let vZ be a two
or three–valued interpretation defined on a set Z ⊆ par(s), We say that vZ
is decisive for s iff for any two (respectively two or three–valued) completions
vpar(s) and v
′
par(s) of v to par(s), it holds that vpar(s)(Cs) = v
′
par(s)(Cs).
We say that s is decisively out/in/undecided wrt vZ if vZ is decisive and all
of its completions map s to respectively out, in, undec.
Example 5. The idea behind this formulation is to identify the partial interpre-
tations that are ”enough” to know the final value of an acceptance condition.
Assume an ADF D = ({a, b}, {(a, a), (a, b), (b, a), (b, b)}, {a : a → b, b : a ∧ b}).
Let v be a partial two–valued interpretation s.t. v(b) = t. Then a→ b will always
evaluate to t no matter the assignment of a and we can say that a is decisively
in wrt to v. It is of course not decisive for b.
With this at hand, we can define the set of arguments permanently excluded
by a given set. The idea behind it corresponds to identifying all the arguments
attacked by an extension E in the Dung setting and is known as the E+ set. Due
to its abstractness, ADFs also give us indirect ways of discarding an argument
and such a straightforward check would be inadequate.
Definition 22. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF and A ⊆ S a conflict–free exten-
sion of D. Let v be a partial two–valued interpretation built as follows:
1. Let M = A. For every a ∈M set v(a) = t.
2. For every argument b ∈ S \M that is decisively out in v, set v(b) = f and
add b to M .
3. Repeat the previous step until there are no new elements added to M .
By A+ we understand the set of arguments vf . The range of A, denoted AR is
defined as A ∪A+. We refer to v as range interpretation of A.3
We can now naturally proceed to admissibility:
Definition 23. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF, A ⊆ S a conflict–free extension
of D and A+ its discarded set. A is admissible in D iff for any F ⊆ S \ A
(F 6= ∅), if there exists an a ∈ A s.t. Ca(par(a)∩(F∪A)) = out then F∩A+ 6= ∅.
3 Please note that although these notions were originally defined for arbitrary sets, in
practice they were always used for at least conflict–free ones and this assumption
allowed us to create a cleaner formulation.
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a b
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Fig. 6. Example of nonequivalence between the formulations of admissibility.
Example 6. Let us come back to the counterexample from Figure 5. Clearly
∅, {b}, {d}, {b, d}, {c, d} and {b, c, d} are admissible; they are not attacked in any
way and hence implication is always true. Let us now check {a}: its discarded set
is empty, while the set {c, d} has the power to out the acceptance condition of
a. The same situation can be observed for {a, c, d} and {a, b}: the discarded sets
are both empty, while we need to be able to counter {b} and {c} respectively.
Thus, none of these sets is admissible.
3.5 Comparison
Moving from the two–valued to the three–valued approach is more than just
a structural change. This was the case also in the Dung setting, even though
both approaches were strongly related [19]. When computing classical exten-
sions, we focus on what arguments we can accept. In the three–valued setting,
a discarded argument is also important and f means something more than just
a lack of acceptance. In this setting u represents the lack of either a proper
reason to accept or discard an argument or will to commit to a value (i.e. we
decide not to assign t or f even though we have sufficient basis for that). As a
result, a semantics truly exploiting a three–valued setting has naturally different
assumptions than a two–valued one. For example it would rather maximize on
the arguments that are not left undecided, rather than just on the ones we are
ready to accept. Therefore if one decides to treat the three–valued setting as
the means of computing extensions in the two–valued one, he or she should take
special care when choosing semantics.
Let us compare the decisive outing and lattice formulations of admissibility.
The main difference lies in the treatment of the self–support and support cycles.
The first one admits both and treats attacks generated by them as valid. The
latter also admits both, however, attacks coming from them do not need to be
defended from. Take the framework depicted in Figure 6. According to the outing
formulation, ∅ and {b} are the only admissible extensions. This comes from the
fact that if we were to utter {a}, an opponent could always respond with {b},
which we cannot counter. In the lattice setting, if we collect just the arguments
set to t, i.e. the arguments accepted in an admissible three-valued interpretation,
then we obtain the following sets: ∅, {a} and {b}.
The fact that the outing definition admits arguments forming support cycles
as valid attackers has some side effects. Most importantly, it breaks the relation
between the stable and the admissible semantics – in this example {a} is a
stable extension, but not (outing) admissible. This does not occur in the lattice
approach.
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As we have mentioned before, there is a difference in motivation behind
the two and three–valued semantics. Take for example the preferred exten-
sions, which in general do not have to agree even if their admissible bases
do. Let us assume a framework consisting of a single self–supporting argument
D = ({a}, {(a, a)}, {a : a}). If we were to follow the standard set inclusion max-
imality definition then {a} would be the preferred extension according to the
outing formulation. However, the lattice version follows information maximality
and both ∅ and {a} would be considered preferred.
Let us close this section with some formal results on how and when can
extensions under both approaches coincide. We will start with the outing to
lattice direction. Please note that it recreates the relation between extensions
from the two to three–valued setting that held in the Dung framework [19].
Theorem 1. Let D = (S,L,C) be an ADF. For any (decisive outing) admissible
extension E of D there exists a lattice admissible three–valued interpretation v3
s.t. vt3 = E.
Proof. We will prove this theorem by constructing an appropriate interpretation
(please note there may be more than one per extension). Let v3 be a u–completion
to S of the range interpretation v of E. Assume that v3 is not lattice admissible,
i.e. it is not the case that v3 ≤i ΓD(v3). This means that the new interpretation
”loses” information, i.e. at least one element formerly mapped to t or f is now u,
or becomes incomparable (some element formerly mapped to t/f goes to f/t).
Let us first take a look at the case when v3(a) = f and ΓD(v3)(a) 6= f .
This means that for at least one w ∈ [v3]2, w(Ca) = t. Consequently, a is not
decisively out in v3 and could not have been decisively out in v. Contradiction.
Now let us consider the case when v3(a) = t and ΓD(v3)(a) 6= t. From this
follows that there is at least one w ∈ [v3]2 s.t. w(Ca) = f . Let F be the set of
all arguments originally mapped to u that are now assigned t, i.e. F = {f ∈ S
s.t. v3(f) = u and w(f) = t}. If the set F is empty, then w is a f–completion
of v and therefore failure for a means E cannot be two–valued conflict–free.
Contradiction. If set F is not empty, it means that Ca(par(a) ∩ E) = in (by
conflict–freeness) and Ca(par(a) ∩ (E ∪ F )) = out (coming from w). Moreover,
F ∩ E+ = ∅ by construction – no element from E+ is assigned u, which is the
requirement for adding to F . Conclusion is that E cannot be outing admissible.
Contradiction.
In what follows we show that the two notions of admissibility, the lattice and
decisive outing formulation, coincide on a special class of ADFs, namely the
bipolar ADFs without support cycles. Although we do not claim that this class
is the maximal one where the semantics agree, it appears natural to consider,
since the semantics can differ when support cycles are present. Note that we
assume finite ADFs, i.e. the set of arguments S is finite.
We prove a technical lemma, which intuitively states that every argument
that is set to f in a three-valued admissible interpretation is rejected either
because the set of accepted arguments together are enough reason to reject it,
or it requires supporters, which are rejected.
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Lemma 2. Let D = (S,L,C) be a bipolar ADF without support cycles and v a
lattice admissible three-valued interpretation in D and a ∈ vf . Then at least one
of the following statements is true.
1. For any M ⊇ vt we have Ca(par(a) ∩M) = out, or
2. suppD(a) 6= ∅ and for any M ⊇ vt with M ∩ suppD(a) ∩ vf = ∅ we have
Ca(par(a) ∩M) = out.
Proof. Assume that v is admissible in D and a ∈ vf . Assume that statement 1
does not hold. This means there exists a M ′ ⊇ vt s.t. Ca(par(a) ∩M ′) = in.
Since v is admissible we have that Ca(par(a) ∩ vt) = out. This follows from the
fact that there exists a w ∈ [v]2 with wt = vt and wf = vf ∪ vu. Since v is
admissible, it follows that Ca(par(a) ∩ wt) = out, since otherwise v(a) 6≤i w(a).
Hence, there exists a x ∈ (M ′ \ vt) which is supporting a.
Now let M ⊇ vt and M ∩ suppD(a) ∩ vf = ∅. Let further Mp = M ∩
par(a), i.e. Mp is restricted to the parents of a. Suppose Ca(M
p) = in, let
X = (Mp \ (attD(a) \ vt)), i.e. X is a subset of Mp, without the attackers
of a, which are not in vt. Then we have that also Ca(X) = in. Suppose the
contrary, i.e. Ca(X) = out, but since Ca(M
p) = in this means that there exists
a b ∈ (Mp \X) with b ∈ suppD(a), which is a contradiction. This in turn implies
X ∩ vf ∩ par(a) = ∅. This is a contradiction to admissibility of v, since also
(vt∩par(a)) ⊆ X holds and admissibility requires that in this case Ca(X) = out,
by a similar reasoning as above.
Now we can show the coincidence of the admissible semantics on the bipolar
ADFs without support cycles.
Theorem 2. Let D = (S,L,C) be a bipolar ADF without support cycles and
v a lattice admissible three-valued interpretation in D, then A = vt is (decisive
outing) admissible in D.
Proof. Assume there exists a non-empty set F ⊆ (S \ A) and M = F ∪ A, s.t.
there exists an argument a ∈ A with Ca(par(a) ∩ M) = out. We first show
that M ∩ vf 6= ∅. Suppose the contrary, i.e. M ∩ vf = ∅. It is straightforward
to see that M ) vt, since Ca(par(a) ∩ vt) = in, otherwise v would not be
admissible in D. Suppose all elements in M which are not in vt are undecided
in v, i.e. (M \ vt) ⊆ vu. But this implies that the corresponding two-valued
interpretation of M , namely v′(s) = t if s ∈ M and v′(s) = f otherwise, must
be in [v]2 and hence v would not be admissible, since then ΓD(v)(a) 6= t.
Now we show that for every r ∈ vf it holds that r ∈ A+, hence vt is decisive
outing admissible in D. Let L+ and L− be the supporting and attacking links of
D and L = L+ ∪ L−. Since the graph G = (S,L+) is an acyclic directed graph
(DAG), we can construct a topological ordering, represented by the function
f : S → N, on the vertices S such that if (a, b) ∈ L+ we have f(a) < f(b). This
means if a supports b, then the former is ordered lower than the latter. We now
show the claim by induction on f(s) for arguments in S.
(IH): Let r ∈ vf , f(r) = i, if ∀r′ ∈ vf , s.t. f(r′) < f(r) we have r′ ∈ A+, then
r ∈ A+.
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(IB): The claim holds for all s 6∈ vf , hence we look at the smallest element in r ∈
vf w.r.t. the ordering induced by f . We know that one of the two statements of
Lemma 2 must hold for r. If the first one holds, then clearly r ∈ A+. Otherwise we
have suppD(r)∩vf = ∅, since r must be the minimal element of the order induced
by f . But then we know that for any M ⊇ A we have that M ∩suppD(r)∩vf = ∅
and thus Cr(par(r) ∩M) = out. Hence r ∈ A+.
(IS): Let r ∈ vf with f(r) = i. We assume that ∀r′ ∈ vf with f(r′) < f(r) it holds
that r′ ∈ A+. Again, since r ∈ vf we know that one of the statements of Lemma 2
is true. Furthermore, if the first one is true, then clearly r ∈ A+. Suppose only
the second statement is true. By assumption, we know that ∀x ∈ suppD(r) ∩ vf
we have that x ∈ A+, since all of the elements in this set are in vf and have
a lower order w.r.t. f . This means (suppD(r) ∩ vf ) ⊆ A+. But then r must
be in A+, since r is decisively out for the partial two-valued interpretation v′,
which sets all elements in A+, in particular suppD(r) ∩ vf to f and all elements
in A to true. Indeed for all M ⊇ A, s.t. M ∩ suppD(r) ∩ vf = ∅ we have that
Cr(par(r) ∩M) = out.
4 Discussion
Notes on defense. Strongly tied to the notion of admissibility is the concept of
defense. Although we have managed to formulate admissibility without making
the defense explicit, giving a proper account of it is required for redefining some
of the stronger semantics. The current definition of the discarded set (A+) can
be a base for detecting defense known from the conflict–based setting (i.e. coun-
terattacking) and one arising in the bipolar setting (e.g. cutting off the support
of an attacker). However, in ADFs, one can defend in one more way. Due to
the fact that the framework (mostly via disjunction in acceptance conditions)
has the possibility to express some weak notion of preference between incoming
relations, we have a case of overpowering defense. Instead of responding to a dis-
card with another discard, we overpower it. A simple example of it would be an
acceptance condition of the form ¬a∨b. As long as b is present in the framework,
accepting a has no effect. It does not require the ”defender” and the ”attacker”
to be connected by a link, and hence cannot be detected by the discarded set.
This type of defense in ADFs is also problematic as often a conflict–free ex-
tension possessing it simply does not ”react” to incoming conflicts. Therefore,
verifying whether a set has the power to defend an argument not belonging to
it in this particular way is challenging.
Revisiting support cycles. From the point of view of ADFs, the ongoing re-
search on bipolarity in argumentation is very important. A thorough overview
can be found in [5]. Although the acceptance conditions allow us to express sup-
port in several ways, we do not yet take into account all of its side effects. In this
section we would like to discuss the problem of support cycles in argumentation.
Although discarded in logic programming and some frameworks [9], they do not
always represent an error in our thinking. A very simple example, yet common
in every day life and, for instance, game theory is the case of mutual agreement.
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An agent can decide to cooperate as long as his opponent agrees to do the same.
This rule ’I play nice as long as you play nice’ is not something irrational or rare.
The ’good will’ mutual agreement is in our opinion a very important example
of reasoning that is not only defeasible (we just ’assume’ everyone else is follow-
ing their commitment, and this assumption can very well be withdrawn when it
turns out it is not the case) but also has a support cycle in it. And yet, it is very
reasonable and, be it good or not, unavoidable.
Nevertheless, there are support cycles that are clearly erroneous and need
to be avoided. Unfortunately, there is not much intuition on how to distinguish
between the ’good’ and the ’bad’ ones. For these reasons, in future we would
like to admit the semantics both with and without the support cycles and use
them according to a given situation. We hope that further research will shed
more light on this case.
Future work. Throughout this paper we have mentioned several open questions
and problems concerning not only the ADFs, but also argumentation overall.
First, we see a need for a discussion on the rationality of arguments, i.e. how
should self–attackers, self–supporters and support cycles be treated. Addressing
the rationality issue would give rise to stricter notions of semantics. Another
task for the future is moving the logic programming style acceptability [17] to
ADFs. In order to give an intuitive definition, a proper account of support cycles
in ADFs is required, which were so far informally described in Section 2.2.
Finally, we would like to formalize the concept of defense in ADFs and provide
a tool for an efficient detection of overpowering. With this concept at hand,
moving over to other well known semantics in this abstract framework is a next
natural step. In particular, complete and preferred semantics can be based on
our notion of admissibility. In case of the latter, this could circumvent certain
problems of the formulation introduced in [16], where three–valued preferred
extensions are not necessarily incomparable on the sets of accepted arguments.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have reviewed the existing definitions of admissibility in abstract
dialectical frameworks — one of the most general enhancements of Dung’s ab-
stract frameworks — and introduced a novel two–valued approach reflecting the
original formulation of admissibility in a more direct way. Besides a thorough
discussion on the conceptual level, we have also compared the approaches on a
formal one. The results show that each new two–valued admissible extension is
also admissible in the three–valued setting of [16], but that the other direction
does not hold in general.
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